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43 
THE FRAME OF REFERENCE AND OTHER 
PROBLEMS 
Richard D. Friedman* 
Jeffrey L. Fisher** 
Given the pair of Fishers, we’ll use first names. And because we have 
more to say about George’s essay, we’ll concentrate our attention there. 1 
I. History 
George argues that, centuries ago, jurists did not distinguish between 
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay, and so the distinction cannot be a 
historically well-grounded basis for modern confrontation doctrine. The 
argument proceeds from an inaccurate frame of reference. 
When the confrontation right developed, principally in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, and English defendants—Raleigh among them—
demanded that adverse witnesses be brought face to face with them, they 
were making a procedural assertion as to how witnesses must give their 
testimony. (Giving testimony is what witnesses in litigation do.) Rarely did 
they phrase this claim in terms of hearsay, for the simple reason that there 
was no rule against hearsay in the modern sense. Similarly, numerous 
statutes protected the right of treason defendants to have witnesses brought 
face to face, and these statutes never mentioned hearsay. 
True, Geoffrey Gilbert’s treatise from the early eighteenth century said 
that “a mere hearsay is no Evidence,” but that was a limp statement: neither 
he nor any other writer at the time elaborated on it.2 (Contrast the dense 
discussion of the law governing witnesses.) They did not offer a definition of 
hearsay, without which an exclusionary rule is indeterminate, nor did they 
catalogue exceptions, without which such a rule would be impractically 
 
 *  Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
 ** Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. 
 1.  We certainly agree with Deborah that it is important to recognize the public 
implications of domestic violence. We do not regard the holding in Hammon v. Indiana as 
violating this principle. There, the suspect was known and in the presence of the police; it was 
clear that there was no imminent danger to anybody. 
 2.  GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 99 (Garland Publ’g 1979) (1754). 
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broad. The fact is that lots of hearsay was admitted in the early- and mid-
eighteenth century, in criminal as well as civil cases.3 
George certainly agrees that not all hearsay should be excluded. But the 
point appears to have escaped John Marshall; Marshall’s broad-brush 1807 
condemnation of all hearsay (and exclusion of a conspirator’s statement) 
proves far too much and offers no support for George. Marshall’s statement 
does suggest that by then—thirty years after the early state constitutions 
articulated the confrontation right, some using the “face-to-face” formula—
lawyerly recognition of, and broad opposition to, hearsay had taken hold.4 
Over succeeding decades, the wide scope of the hearsay rule tended to make 
it, rather than the confrontation right, the doctrinal focus, even as the rule 
was whittled and shaped by exceptions that made its scope more practical 
but obscured its rationale. 
As for George’s argument based on the statement by the Portuguese 
gentleman in Raleigh’s case, Rich responded to this precise argument earlier 
in the year, so given word limitations we will offer only a citation here.5 
And as for dying declarations: When the doctrine emerged, it was not 
conceived as an exception to the rule against hearsay, which was still in 
embryonic form. Rather, the stated rationale was that imminent death was as 
powerful a sanction as the oath—in other words, that a surrogate for the 
ordinary required conditions of testimony was present. (Rich has argued 
repeatedly that forfeiture provides a better rationale.6) Even as the hearsay 
rule began to gel, a leading case described dying declarations as an 
alternative (along with formal statements to a justice of the peace taken 
under statutory directive) to the ordinary way of giving evidence—live 
testimony subject to oath and confrontation in open court.7 
II. Standards 
Like George, we have been disappointed by the Supreme Court’s failure 
thus far to articulate a fully developed conception of what is “testimonial.” 
 
 3.  E.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 234–35 
(2003); T.P. Gallanis, The Rise of Modern Evidence Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1999); John H. 
Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1189–90 (1996). 
 4.  See Gallanis, supra note 3, at 503 (“[T]he 1780s were a period of considerable 
activity and . . . by 1800 much of the modern approach to hearsay was already in place.”). 
 5.  Richard D. Friedman, The Mold That Shapes Hearsay Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 433, 
459–62 (2014). 
 6.  E.g., Richard D. Friedman, Giles v. California: A Personal Reflection, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 733 (2009). 
 7.  King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789). 
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But the problem is fixable—it is not the fault of the underlying approach—
because such a conception is available. 
We agree that it is confusing to speak of an actor’s primary purpose 
“objectively considered.” Purpose is a subjective matter. But this aspect of 
the problem would disappear if the Court spoke, as we believe it should, in 
terms of reasonable anticipation—rather than purpose—of prosecutorial use. 
Whose anticipation? Again, we agree that the Court has muddied the 
waters. Justice Scalia is right: it is the anticipation of the declarant, the 
purported witness, that should be decisive.8 We believe that this is not 
inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncements that the perspective of the 
questioner, if there is one, should be taken into account: what the declarant 
understands the purpose of the questioner to be may serve as a key factor in 
determining likely use of the statement. (And there is nothing perverse, by 
the way, about the fact that a prosecutor might create evidence without being 
subject to the Confrontation Clause; evidence creation alone is not sufficient 
to invoke the clause, which is indisputably about witnessing.) 
III. Reliability 
George contends that the best rationale for Crawford is that “declarants 
who speak in anticipation of trial have reason to lie, rendering their 
statements unreliable,” but his argument misses the mark. Crawford, while 
recognizing that the Confrontation Clause creates “a procedural rather than 
a substantive guarantee,” spoke of its “ultimate goal” as being “to ensure 
reliability of evidence.” That’s not quite right. Eyewitness testimony is 
notoriously unreliable, and confrontation cannot ensure reliability; when two 
witnesses give conflicting evidence, both cannot be reliable. The most we can 
hope for is that confrontation will help the trier of fact make accurate 
findings out of an assemblage of evidence, much of which may be very 
unreliable. But whether or not that is true, the real purpose of the clause is to 
ensure that witnesses perform their function under historically prescribed 
conditions (that is, face to face, under oath, subject to cross-examination, 
and, if reasonably possible, in open court). When a witness testifies at trial, a 
judge does not say, “That was so reliable that no cross is necessary.” There’s 
no reason for a different result when a witness has testified out of court, with 
the expectation that the testimony will be used for criminal investigation and 
prosecution. 
 
 8.  We will not discuss here whether the ordinarily applicable approach should be 
adjusted, or replaced altogether, when the speaker is a child or a person with developmental 
deficiencies. 
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IV. ROBERTS Redux? 
In the end, George’s proposed solution is essentially an attempt to create 
an ideal hearsay code and give it constitutional force. While creating such a 
hearsay code is a worthwhile project, we respectfully suggest that it has 
nothing to do with the confrontation right. At any rate, there is no reason to 
believe a second attempt at turning the confrontation right into a catalogue 
of supposedly reliable classes of evidence, backed up by case-specific 
assessment, would be any more successful than the first. Can we really say 
that custodial confessions are inherently unreliable? Even a confession 
acknowledging responsibility for a murder, as in Lee v. Illinois?9 Someone 
nostalgic for a return to the era in which the Court transformed the 
confrontation right into an attempted sifter of good and bad evidence might 
take pause from the fact that, decades into the Roberts regime, lower courts 
mangled cases like Lee, Lilly v. Virginia,10 and Crawford. In each of these 
instances, the lower courts held admissible against the accused a statement 
made out of court to the authorities by another person—even though for 
more than three centuries it had been obvious that one could not act as a 
valid witness against another by making a custodial confession.11 
It is true, though unfortunate, that four justices think that the scientific 
underpinnings of forensic lab reports, at least in part, make such reports 
nontestimonial. But no member of the present Court has stated that he or 
she wishes to return to the Roberts regime. Small wonder; it yielded a 
doctrine without historical or textual basis, one that gave inadequate 
guidance to the lower courts and failed to provide clear protection in core 
cases. 
The testimonial approach expresses a sound conception of the 
confrontation right. It has not yet developed as fully as it should. But the 
missteps that George identifies and some resulting opacity in the doctrine 
need not constrain the future. 
 
 
 9.  476 U.S. 530 (1986). 
 10.  527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
 11.  Tong’s Case, Kel. J. 17, 18, 84 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (K.B. 1662). 
